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The Trend Toward the Extension of Batson to
Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Supreme Court decided Batson v. Kentucky' in 1986,
the extent of the limitations placed upon the use of peremptory
challenges has been questioned in various state and federal court
decisions. The purpose of this comment is to provide an overview
of one particular aspect of the limitation on peremptory chal-
lenges: Should the holding in Batson be extended to apply to gen-
der-based peremptory challenges based upon the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution? 2 Although the Supreme
Court has yet to rule upon the validity of equal protection chal-
lenges to peremptory strikes based upon the gender of the venire
persons, lower courts have addressed the issue, creating a split
among various jurisdictions with contrary holdings.
This comment will examine seminal Supreme Court decisions re-
garding the limits of the peremptory challenge in order to deter-
mine the Court's intentions regarding the extent of Batson, as well
as recent state and federal opinions which have, in fact, held that
Batson applies to gender-based peremptory strikes. Finally, an
analysis of established case law will be undertaken to discuss the
possible future developments in this issue.
II. THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
The peremptory challenge has its origins in thirteenth century
England.3 Through its inception in English common law felonies,
the challenge was defined as "an arbitrary and capricious species of
challenge to a certain number of jurors, without showing any cause
at all; which is called a peremptory challenge."" The tradition of
the peremptory challenge was carried to the American colonies,
1. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-13 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986). The Supreme Court traced the history of the challenge, commencing
with The Ordinance for Inquests, 33 Edw. 1, Stat. 4 (1305). Swain, 380 U.S. at 213.
4. Id. at 212 n.9 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 353 (15th ed. 1809)).
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and the federal government of the young United States of America
continued the English practice, as did individual state courts.'
The Supreme Court, in Swain v. Alabama,6 noted that the use of
peremptories in England had been steadily decreasing, whereas in
the United States, the practice of employing the challenges has
persisted. 7 One proposed explanation for this phenomenon is the
voir dire in American trials, which has been characterized as "ex-
tensive and probing," and is therefore conducive to the use of per-
emptories in such a protracted proceeding.8 Most importantly, the
Court recognized the salient role of the peremptory challenge in
"eliminat[ing] extremes of partiality on both sides . . . [while] as-
sur[ing] the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case
will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and
not otherwise."' Thus, the Court reaffirmed the necessity of the
peremptory challenge as part of trial by jury.10 Drawing from pre-
cedent, the opinion continued to elaborate on the commonly un-
derstood definition of the peremptory challenge, which is exercised
without the requirement of a statement of cause."1 The strike is
routinely exercised upon the "sudden impressions and unaccounta-
ble prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and ges-
tures of another,"' 2 and upon the "habits and associations" of the
potential juror."3 Finally, the Court noted that the peremptory
challenge is often "exercised on grounds normally thought irrele-
vant to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, reli-
gion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for
5. Swain, 380 U.S. at 216-17.
6. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
7. Id. at 218. The Court noted that English juries are selected from a smaller cross-
section of a relatively homogeneous society, in contrast to the larger, more heterogeneous
American public. Id. Moreover, the Court maintained that the English courts possess
greater control over pretrial publicity, thereby reducing news media attention and prevent-
ing the venire persons from forming opinions regarding the case prior to the commencement
of litigation. Id. at 218 n.24 (citations omitted).
8. Id. at 218-19 (citations omitted).
9. Id. at 219. The Court continued to state that "the very availability of perempto-
ries allows counsel to ascertain the possibility of bias through probing questions on the voir
dire and facilitates the exercise of the challenges for cause by removing the fear of incurring
a juror's hostility through examination and challenge for cause." Id. at 219-20.
10. Id. at 219.
11. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220. "The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that
it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry, and without being subject to the
court's control." Id.
12. Id. (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892)).




III. SUPREME COURT RULINGS ON THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
PRIOR TO Batson
It is precisely as the result of the use of peremptory challenges
based upon criteria the Swain Court labeled "normally irrelevant
to legal proceedings" that the trend toward limiting the scope of
the peremptory challenge emerged. The genesis of the debate com-
menced in 1879 with Strauder v. West Virginia,'" wherein the
State of West Virginia disallowed black persons to be members of
grand or petit juries.16 Petitioner, a black male, asserted that his
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights were violated as a
result of the exclusion of black persons from the jury which would
sentence him.' 7 The Supreme Court held that the West Virginia
statute discriminated in the selection of jurors on the basis of race,
thereby denying equal protection of the laws to a black man who is
tried by jury.' 8 In so ruling, the Court implemented the standards
of the Equal Protection Clause into the jury selection process,
thereby setting the stage for Swain v. Alabama.'9
In Swain, the petitioner, a black male, contended that his equal
protection rights were violated by the prosecution's peremptory
strikes against all black members of the venire.20 The Supreme
14. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220 (citations omitted).
15. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
16. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304. The petitioner, a black man, was indicted for murder
in West Virginia. Id. The petitioner prayed for removal of the action to a federal court due
to the fact that any jury impaneled in West Virginia, by law, would be composed of white
males. Id.
17. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment states, in pertinent part:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310. The Court also noted that "the constitution of juries is
a very essential part of the protection such a mode of trial is intended to secure." Id. at 308.
The Court continued to state that the "idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the
peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine ..
Id.
19. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
20. Swain, 380 U.S. at 205-06. The venire was composed of eight black persons, two
of whom were exempt, and six of whom were dismissed by the court as a result of the
prosecution's peremptory challenges. Id. at 205. The State of Alabama did not wholly ex-
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 32:833
Court determined that, because all groups, including racial groups,
were subject to being peremptorily struck, the removal of all black
members of the venire was not a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.2" The Court continued to find that subjecting the peremp-
tory "challenge in any particular case to the demands of the Equal
Protection Clause would entail a radical change in the nature and
operation of the challenge."22
Thus, the Swain Court set a high standard for a petitioner to
meet when attempting to establish an equal protection claim in-
volving the use of allegedly racially-motivated peremptory chal-
lenges,2" despite the Court's statement that the Equal Protection
Clause would be violated by intentionally removing black persons
from the venire solely because of their race. 4 In effect, the Court
appeared to draw the line at the extension of equal protection
analysis with its decisions in Strauder and Swain, and it was not
until 1986 that the Court would again consider the merits of such a
case.
25
IV. BATSON AND ITS PROGENY
Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Batson v. Kentucky,26
clude black persons from jury panels, as was the case in Strauder, but no black person had
served on a petit jury in Talladega County, Alabama, in the fifteen years preceding Swain.
Id. at 206.
21. Id. at 212.
22. Id. at 221-22. The Court continued to state that should the Equal Protection
Clause be applied to the peremptory challenge, "[t]he challenge, pro tanto, would no longer
be peremptory ...." Id. at 222. The end result of such action would be to subject each
challenge to review for "reasonableness and sincerity." Id.
However, the Court recognized the potential for a valid equal protection claim involving
peremptory challenges. Justice White, writing for the majority, noted that, where the prose-
cutor, in case after case, "is responsible .. .for the removal of Negroes who have been
selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and who have survived challenges for
cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries, the Fourteenth Amendment
claim takes on added significance." Id. at 223. In such instances, where "the purposes of the
peremptory challenge are being perverted," the Court indicated a different result would lie.
Id. at 224.
23. Id. at 223-24. Referring to the specific facts of the case before it, the Court as-
serted that a prima facie case of denial of equal protection may be met where the prosecu-
tor, through peremptory challenges, removes all black persons from the venire so that no
black persons ever serve on a jury, then "the presumption protecting the prosecutor may
well be overcome." Id. at 224. However, the record in the case revealed that such a complete
exclusion of black persons from Alabama juries was not proven, and the Court declined to
analyze the matter further. Id. at 224.
24. Id. at 203-04.
25. The Court overruled Swain in its decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986).
26. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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stated that the Court intended to reexamine the holding in Swain
regarding the "evidentiary burden placed upon a criminal defend-
ant who claims that he has been denied equal protection through
the State's use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of his
race from the . ..jury. "27 The Court commenced its analysis by
reaffirming its decision in Strauder, wherein the Court maintained
that the racial discrimination in jury selection is violative of the
principles of equal protection, in that such discrimination robs de-
fendants of the assurance that a jury of their peers will determine
their fate. 28 Moreover, the Court pointed out that racial discrimi-
nation in jury selection is harmful not only to the defendant, but
also to the entire community, as such actions "undermine public
confidence in the fairness of our system of justice." 9
Competence as a juror, the Court contended, is dependent upon
an assessment of individual qualifications and impartiality, and
therefore one's ability to serve on a jury is unrelated to one's
race.30 Hence, the Court concluded that the utilization by the state
of race-based peremptory challenges is subject to the commands of
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. 1
In so holding, the Court set forth a three-part test in order to
establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in jury
selection.2 First, defendants must demonstrate that they are mem-
bers of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor employed
peremptory challenges to exclude members of the defendants' race
from the venire 3 Second, defendants may "rely on the fact ...
that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection process that
27. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82. In Batson, the defendant was a black male who was in-
dicted for second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. Id. During voir dire, the pros-
ecutor employed peremptory challenges and thereby excused all the black persons in the
venire. Id. at 83. The impaneled jury, composed solely of white persons, subsequently con-
victed the petitioner on all counts, and the petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court, alleg-
ing a violation of his equal protection rights through the prosecutor's use of peremptories to
remove all black venire members. Id.
28. Id. at 86 (citing Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308). The Court continued to assert that
the venire "must be indifferently chosen to secure the defendant's right under the Four-
teenth Amendment to 'protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice.' " Bat-
son, 476 U.S. at 86-87 (quoting Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309).
29. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
30. Id. at 87 (citing Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 223-24 (1946)).
31. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. "[T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to
challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption the black
jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black
defendant." Id.




permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate. ' s4
Finally, defendants must raise an inference through the use of
these facts and "any other relevant circumstances," that the prose-
cutor exercised the peremptory strikes to exclude members of the
venire from a jury on account of their race.
Once the defendant has established a prima facie case, the bur-
den shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation
for striking the jurors.3 6 The Court took note of the fact that "this
requirement imposes a limitation in some cases on the full peremp-
tory character" of the challenge, and pointed out that it is unnec-
essary that the explanation of the challenge meet the same stan-
dards as a challenge for cause.
37
Responding to. the objections of the prosecutor that the holding
of the Court "will eviscerate the fair trial values served by the pe-
remptory challenge," the Court maintained that there is no consti-
tutional right to the peremptory challenge. Moreover, the major-
ity in Batson cited the fact that, in practice, the challenge has been
exercised in such a manner as to discriminate against black jurors,
which is forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause. 9 Thus, in re-
versing its position on the applicability of the Equal Protection
Clause to peremptory challenges as set forth in Swain, the Court
struck the first blow to the challenge and commenced the trend
toward limiting its use under the aegis of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Having injected the strictures of the Equal Protection Clause
into the jury selection process, the Court at first appeared unwill-
ing to extend Batson beyond challenges to peremptories based on
race.4° Justice O'Connor, concurring in the denial of certiorari in
Brown v. North Carolina,4" maintained that Batson does not apply
34. Id. at 96 (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 97.
36. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
37. Id. However, the Court warned that the prosecutor "may not rebut the defend-
ant's prima facie case of discrimination by merely stating that he challenged jurors of the
defendant's race on the assumption-or his intuitive judgment-that they would be partial
to the defendant because of their shared race." Id.
38. Id. at 98.
39. Id. at 98-99. In fact, the majority stated that its decision, "requiring trial courts
to be sensitive to the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, . enforces the
mandate of equal protection and furthers the ends of justice." Id. at 99.
40. Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940 (1986). The Court denied certiorari on
petitioner's claim that peremptory strikes based upon the prospective juror's concerns re-
garding capital punishment violated the Equal Protection Clause. Brown, 479 U.S. at 941.
41. 479 U.S. 940.
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outside the confines of racially-discriminatory challenges.42 How-
ever, the Court did expand the coverage of Batson to situations in
which the criminal defendant and the prospective juror do not
share the same race.43
Perhaps the most significant development in the trend toward
limiting the use of peremptory challenges occurred in Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co." In that decision, the Court held that race-
based exclusion from jury service in civil trials is subject to the
same equal protection restrictions as are criminal proceedings. 4 5
Thus, all peremptory strikes allegedly made upon racially-discrimi-
natory grounds, in both civil and criminal proceedings, were ren-
dered subject to the Batson rule requiring the litigant to articulate
a race-neutral reason for the exercise of such a strike. Having lim-
ited the applicability of the peremptory challenge by requiring the
articulation of race-neutral reasons for exercising peremptory
strikes, and then mandating such a showing in civil as well as crim-
inal proceedings, the Court was perceived by some lower courts to
have opened the door to further restriction of the peremptory
challenge."
42. Id. at 941 (O'Connor, J., concurring). According to Justice O'Connor, Batson "de-
pends upon this Nation's profound commitment to the ideal of racial equality," and aside
from racial grounds, prosecutors may exercise their challenges for any reason. Id. (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
43. Melissa C. Hinton, Note, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.: Has Batson Been
Stretched Too Far? 57 Mo. L. REV. 569, 576-77 (1992) (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400
(1991)). In Powers, the petitioner, a white male, was indicted for aggravated murder, and in
the course of the voir dire, the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to strike seven of
ten black venire members. Powers, 499 U.S. at 421-22. Convicted by the jury, petitioner
claimed his equal protection rights were violated, and the Court ruled that restricting the
holding in Batson to instances where the defendant and the challenged juror. are of the same
race "conforms neither with our accepted rules of standing to raise a constitutional claim
nor with the substantive guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause .... " Id. at 422.
44. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991). It has been proposed that, due to the fact that "Powers
focused broadly on the harm the discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges causes to
the excluded venire members as well as to the entire community, the decision invited an
extension of Batson to civil actions." Hinton, cited at note 43, at 577.
45. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2087. The Court proceeded to examine the requirement
of state action necessary to construe a private litigant as a state actor for the purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 2083-86. However, a discussion of the state action re-
quirements for an equal protection challenge of peremptory strikes is beyond the scope of
this comment.
46. See, for example, United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992); Peo-
ple v. Irizarry, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739
(N.D. 1993).
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V. THE BASIS FOR EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES INVOLVING
GENDER
The Supreme Court, attempting to rectify the abuse of the pe-
remptory challenge, invoked the principles of the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause, causing commentators to
speculate whether the Court had taken the first step toward the
elimination of the challenge.47 Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in
Batson, contended that the Court, although basing its holding on
the Fourteenth Amendment, was not employing conventional
equal protection principles to the peremptory challenge issue when
it limited its holding to race.48 However, if such traditional princi-
ples are to be applied, the Chief Justice maintained, then "presum-
ably defendants could object to exclusions on the basis of not only
race, but also sex."49
Traditional Equal Protection Clause5" analysis calls for an inter-
mediate level of scrutiny for quasi-suspect classes,51 and gender is
included in the definition of such a class s.5 Thus, where the Batson
Court employed an equal protection analysis when confronted with
a peremptory challenge based upon race, it appears logical that the
Fourteenth Amendment would similarly mandate protection for
other classes which have been included within its purview, includ-
ing gender. Such an extrapolation of the Court's holding is the log-
ical step in an analysis of the limitations upon the peremptory
challenge, unless the Court intended that Batson apply only in
cases of race, thereby drawing an arbitrary line when it granted
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hence, several courts
have followed this line of reasoning in the absence of a Supreme
Court determination as to whether Equal Protection Clause analy-
sis of peremptory challenges is exclusively limited to racial groups.
47. See Denise J. Am, Batson: Beginning of the End of the Peremptory Challenge,
May ARMY LAW. 33 (1990).
48. Batson, 476 U.S. at 123 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 124 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The Chief Justice pointed
to Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), in which the Court held gender-based differentials in
an Oklahoma statute constituted a denial of equal protection. Craig, 429 U.S. at 210.
50. See note 17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Equal Protection
Clause.
51. Dave Harbeck, Eliminating Unconstitutional Juries: Applying United States v.
De Gross to all Heightened Scrutiny Equal Protection Groups in the Exercise of Peremp-
tory Challenges, 77 MINN. L. REV. 689, 694-95 (1993). This level of review requires a demon-
stration that the action in question is substantially related to an important governmental
purpose. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
52. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971).
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Chief Justice Burger recognized the possibility of this occurrence
when, dissenting in Batson, he warned against turning "the voir
dire into a Title VII proceeding in miniature." 8
VI. FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS
In 1988, two years after the Supreme Court's decision in Batson,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down its opinion in
United States v. Hamilton.4 In that case, the court was faced with
the question of whether the Equal Protection Clause compels an
extension of Batson to situations in which peremptory challenges
are exercised on the basis of gender. 5 Although the government
stated that it struck the venire members in question because they
were female and it desired to have more males on the panel,56 the
court rejected the contention that the commands of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause extend the holding of Batson to gender-based pe-
remptory strikes.
57
The Hamilton court asserted that there was "no authority sup-
port[ing] an extension of Batson to instances other than racial dis-
crimination. '8 s An examination of the opinion in Batson, the court
claimed, lent no credence to the argument that the Supreme Court
intended traditional equal protection analysis to be applied to pe-
remptory challenges on bases other than race.5 9 Reading Batson in
a narrow fashion, the court concluded that, "if the Supreme Court
... had desired, it could have abolished the peremptory chal-
lenges or prohibited the exercise of the challenges on the basis of
race, gender, age or other group classification, 60 but it opted in-
53. Batson, 476 U.S. at 126 n.7 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
54. 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed, Washington v. United States, 489
U.S. 1094 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990).
55. Hamilton, 850 F.2d at 1042. Five of the fourteen defendants in the case were
female, and all of the defendants were black persons. Id. at 1039, 1041. The government
exercised seven of its eight peremptory challenges to exclude black members of the venire,
and the district court concluded that the government had articulated a racially neutral ex-
planation. Id. at 1041. On appeal, the defendants maintained that the government's use of
three peremptory challenges to strike females was a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Id. at 1040-41. The government stated that it wanted more men on the jury, and
that it had, in fact, struck three potential jurors because they were female. Id. at 1041.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1042.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Hamilton, 850 F.2d at 1042. The court considered the Supreme Court's restric-
tion of the challenge to race to indicate an intent to carve out a single exception to the
practice, reaffirming the "important position of the peremptory challenge in our jury sys-
tem." Id. at 1042-43.
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stead to limit its holding only to race.1
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in
United States v. De Gross,2 decided in 1992. The issue before the
De Gross court was whether equal protection prohibited a criminal
defendant from exercising peremptory strikes on the basis of gen-
der," and whereas the Fourth Circuit espoused a narrow interpre-
tation of Batson, the Ninth Circuit considered the fact that "the
Court's language was couched in racial terms" to be irrelevant, and
concluded that Batson's rationale applies equally well to gender-
based peremptory strikes."
In expanding the racial limitation on the exercise of peremptory
challenges to include gender, the Ninth Circuit engaged in an ex-
amination of past gender discrimination in the judicial system.
The jury system, the court maintained, has served as a forum for
"government sanctioned exclusion of women,"6 dating from com-
mon law juries' exclusion of women based upon the doctrine of
propter defectum sexus, or a defect of sex." Even the Supreme
Court partook in this discrimination when it held that, although
jury service could not be made exclusive of black persons, it could
discriminate against women."7 Rejecting this historical discrimina-
tion against women, the court noted that, like race, a person's gen-
der does not impact upon one's ability to be impartial, but rather,
exclusions based on sex are predicated upon an assumption that
the class itself is incompetent to serve."' Thus, the court concluded
that equal protection principles safeguard against the use of pe-
61. Two other circuits have rejected the expansion of Batson to peremptory chal-
lenges based upon gender. See United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 989 (1992).
62. 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992). Juana Espericueta De Gross was convicted of aid-
ing and abetting the transportation of an alien within the United States. De Gross, 960 F.2d
at 1435. During voir dire, the defendant peremptorily struck seven male venire members,
and the government objected that the defendant was exercising the challenges in a gender-
based discriminatory manner. Id. at 1435-36. When the defendant offered no explanation,
the court disallowed the challenge, yet when the government struck a Hispanic woman, stat-
ing that it desired a "more representative community of men and women on the jury," the
trial court permitted the strike. Id. at 1436.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1438.
65. Id.
66. Id. (citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *362).
67. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1438 (citing Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310).
68. Id. at 1438-39. The court analogized the rationale for race-based exclusion with
that for gender, and concluded that their similarities warranted the abolition of the attor-
ney's right to use either of such classifications which do not reflect individual ability, but
rather reflect prejudice and bias against the group as a whole. Id. at 1439.
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remptory challenges based upon gender, just as those principles
prohibit race-based strikes.69
VII. STATE COURT DECISIONS
On the state court level, several jurisdictions likewise began to
expand the Batson limitation to gender, preceding the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision in De Gross. One of the earliest of these opinions
was handed down by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
of New York in People v. Irizarry , in which that court held that
the equal protection rationale employed in Batson should apply to
other cognizable groups, including gender. 71 The Irizarry court
based its holding upon the fact that, because the Supreme Court
had based Batson upon the Equal Protection Clause, the full range
of protection granted under its traditional analysis should apply.72
The brief opinion in Irizarry did not reflect an exhaustive explora-
tion of the issue of gender discrimination, nor did it analyze
whether Batson was a narrow equal protection exception. Instead,
the court assumed that such was the case and then merely applied
the traditional equal protection analysis to the matter.
More recently, the Supreme Court of North Dakota also main-
tained that gender-based peremptory strikes violate the Four-
teenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause in Mandan v. Fern."
In Mandan, the court addressed the striking of male venire mem-
bers on the basis of gender, and, while recognizing that the Su-
preme Court had not ruled as to the extension of Batson to such
instances, the North Dakota court chose to follow the lead set by
the Ninth Circuit in De Gross4.7  Labelling gender-based peremp-
69. Id. The court thereby noted and rejected the Fourth Circuit's contrary holding in
Hamilton. Id. at 1438 n.6.
70. 560 N.Y.S.2d 279 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
71. Irizarry, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 280. The prosecutor peremptorily struck nine female
jurors, and the court found that the defendant had made a prima facie showing of discrimi-
natory conduct. Id. at 279-80. The court then issued a written decision upon the defendant's
motion for a mistrial, noting that only two of the strikes appeared to be pretextual, and
denied the motion. Id. at 280.
72. Id. at 280-81. Analogizing the case at hand to Batson, the court stated that exclu-
sion based on sex alone harms the challenged juror as well as the community as a whole,
thereby following the Supreme Court's reasoning for limitations on race-based challenges.
Id. at 280.
73. 501 N.W.2d 739,746 (N.D. 1993).
74. Mandan, 501 N.W.2d at 744-45. The court examined the split between the cir-
cuits upon this issue, and rejected the rationale in the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Broussard.
Id. at 747. Broussard, in refusing to extend Batson to gender-based exclusions, stated that,
"[i]n equal protection terms, the contributions to a perception of fairness in the petit jury of
1994 843
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tory strikes "a bad remnant of the historical denial of women's
rights," the court asserted that "[s]ex discrimination, like race dis-
crimination, 'has no place in the courtroom.' ,75
Engaging in a more complete review of the case law on this issue,
the court pointed to the continuing discrimination on the basis of
gender as evidenced by the prevalence of attorneys' manuals on
jury selection.a The court deplored the manuals' reliance upon
"crude stereotypes and categorical assumptions about the influence
of gender,"' 77 and pointed out that these types of stereotypes are of
the class "that the Court has previously struck down when relied
upon by state actors in allocating rights, benefits, or burdens.
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Thus, the North Dakota Supreme Court chose to apply traditional
Equal Protection Clause analysis to the issue of gender-based pe-
remptory challenges based upon a reading of Batson similar to
that of the Ninth Circuit in De Gross./a
VIII. THE EXPANSION OF BATSON HERALDS THE ABOLITION OF
THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
The Supreme Court decisions in Strauder and Batson clearly
made reference to the Equal Protection Clause as the basis for
peremptory challenges is an important governmental interest. . . . That interest would be
frustrated by extending Batson to gender because it would require, on demand of counsel,
an explanation for every strike." Id. (quoting Broussard, 987 F.2d at 220) (footnotes
omitted).
Mandan similarly rejected its perception of the Fifth Circuit's reasoning that:
[Slex discrimination in jury selection, unlike race discrimination, will not succeed be-
cause it will not prevent members of the discriminated-against class from serving on
most juries, because there are too many in that class to be totally excluded, and so
there is no justification or need for extending Batson to gender discrimination.
Id. at 747-48.
75. Id. at 746 (quoting Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2088).
76. Mandan, 501 N.W.2d at 746.
77. Id. Some manuals state, for example, that "women make more sympathetic jurors
when children are involved, that male jurors are preferable when 'clearly demonstrated
blackboard figures' are involved, and that men are 'hardboiled' and women 'emotional.'" Id.
(citing Note, Beyond Batson: Eliminating Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1920, 1932 (1992) [hereinafter Beyond Batson] (footnotes omitted)).
78. Mandan, 501 N.W.2d at 746 (citing Beyond Batson, 105 HARV. L. REV. at 1932).
79. Mandan, 501 N.W.2d at 746-47. Various other state courts have held Batson to
be applicable to gender-based peremptory challenges by virtue of individual state constitu-
tions. See State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845 (Haw. 1990); DiDonato v. Santini, 283 Cal. Rptr.
751 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
Other state courts have refused to extend the limits on the challenge to include gender.
See State v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867 (R.I. 1987); State v. Culver, 444 N.W.2d 662 (Neb. 1989);
Ex parte Murphy, 596 So.2d 45 (Ala. 1992), cert. denied, Murphy v. Alabama, 113 S. Ct. 86
(1992).
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those holdings, and it is likewise evident that the motivation be-
hind those opinions was to remedy racial discrimination in the
courtroom.80 Similarly, the De Gross court employed equal protec-
tion analysis in an attempt to rectify what it perceived as gender
discrimination in voir dire through the use of peremptory strikes.8 1
As previously noted, state courts have likewise put equal protec-
tion principles to use in restricting the use of the challenge. Thus,
the extension of Batson to gender-based challenges has been
couched in terms of whether Batson was a narrow exception to the
general rule of peremptory challenges, or rather one aspect of full
Equal Protection Clause analysis of the practice.2 However, given
the predicted chilling effect of the application of traditional equal
protection principles to the peremptory challenge, 83 the ultimate
issue is not one of equal protection. Rather, the question is
whether the peremptory challenge should continue to be counte-
nanced in the American judicial system, or whether such unex-
plained strikes based upon the internal biases and gut reactions of
attorneys have outlived their usefulness in the modern courtroom.
In practice, the expansion of Batson to embrace sex-based chal-
lenges will lengthen the voir dire, as virtually every strike may be
challenged on the basis of suspected gender discrimination. A se-
ries of such miniature hearings on peremptory strikes will un-
doubtedly protract an already painfully slow litigation process,
thereby burdening the administration of justice to a great degree.
Should, or indeed can, the judicial system sustain such a heavy
burden at the infant stages of every trial? If not, perhaps the
proper response to such a result should be the elimination of the
practice in favor of challenges for cause as the sole court-sanc-
tioned strike. Therein lies the hidden agenda behind the trend of
extending Batson to encompass the full ambit of equal protection
principles and analysis.
Some commentators have decried the very existence of the pe-
remptory challenge in the American court system.84 Judge Broder-
ick has stated that "the peremptory challenge is offensive to both
the federal Constitution and basic concepts of justice," and that
80. See Strauder, 101 U.S. at 312; Batson, 476 U.S. at 86.
81. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1348.
82. See Brown, 479 U.S. at 941 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Hamilton, 850 F.2d at
1042; De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1438; Mandan, 501 N.W.2d at 746.
83. Batson, 476 U.S. at 126 n.7 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
84. See, e.g., Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should be
Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 369 (1992).
1994
Duquesne Law Review
therefore "peremptory challenges should be abolished." 85 Explain-
ing his position, Broderick labels the strike as "typically misdi-
rected at the outset," and geared toward fostering the "prerogative
of using peremptory challenges to deny persons the constitutional
right to be jurors in order to accomplish their [(the attorneys and
their clients)] objective of obtaining, not an impartial jury, but a
jury which would be partial." 86 More importantly, Judge Broderick
suggests that empirical evidence lends no credence to the presump-
tion that peremptory challenges further the goals of fair trials.
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For example, Judge Broderick cited the findings of Hans Zeisel
and Shari Seidman Diamond in their study of the use of peremp-
tory challenges in the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois.8 Zeisel and Diamond examined the correla-
tion between the use of peremptory challenges and success at trial
by seating peremptorily-struck venire members in the courtroom
as "shadow jurors." 89 The shadow jurors revealed how they would
have voted in the case,90 rendering "essentially the same propor-
tion of guilty votes . . . as the real jurors .... "91 Zeisel and Dia-
mond therefore concluded that the attorneys using peremptory
challenges were unable to identify potential bias,92 contradicting
the central justification for the use of the strike and lending
credence to the argument for its abolition.
With practitioners arguing for the total elimination of the pe-
remptory challenge, it is clear that the essence of the debate over
the extension of Batson to gender-based challenges is but one facet
of the drive to eliminate the strike altogether. Should the Supreme
Court expand Batson to gender discrimination, the logical step
would be to afford the entire scope of equal protection to the prac-
tice, maiming the challenge to the point that it is, in effect,
abolished.
IX. CONCLUSION
Since the Supreme Court- rendered its decision in Batson, the
85. Broderick, cited at note 84, at 371.
86. Id. at 411.
87. Id. at 413.
88. Id. at 412-13 (citing Hans Zeisel and Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Pe-
remptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30
STAN. L. REV. 491 (1978)).
89. Zeisel and Diamond, cited at note 88, at 492.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 513.
92. Id. at 528.
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courts of the nation, both state and federal, have engaged in a con-
tinuing debate as to whether the full range of equal protection
analysis is to be applied to the peremptory challenge. Many courts
have viewed the slow erosion of the challenge in the jury selection
process dating from Strauder to be an indication that the peremp-
tory challenge is facing its demise at the hands of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. Other courts, and indeed some Supreme Court jus-
tices, have maintained that the Batson limitation is based
exclusively on the unique history of racial discrimination in
America, and should therefore be confined to a single exception to
the peremptory challenge.
Although the Supreme Court has observed, without judgment,
the split among the courts on this issue since Batson was decided,
it may finally be prepared to resolve the issue in J.E.B. v. T.B.9
Directly faced with the question of whether Batson was a narrow
exception to the peremptory challenge based upon race, or was
rather one facet of full, traditional Equal Protection Clause analy-
sis of the utilization of the strike, the Court may well render a de-
cision amounting to the emasculation or complete elimination of
the peremptory challenge. The Court has been given the opportu-
nity to address the issue of the necessity of the peremptory strike,
and should recognize the chance to either affirm or abolish the
practice. The question of the propriety of the extension of Batson
to gender-based strikes is secondary to the issue of the existence of
the challenge, as future cases revolving Batson's applicability to
alienage, national origin, or age, for example, will most assuredly
arise, mounting new challenges to the use of the peremptory strike.
A firm landmark decision by the Court will preempt such develop-
ments and demonstrate the Court's sensitivity to the trends and
practices of trial advocacy. The Court should resist the temptation
to carve out another exception to the challenge, and leave unan-
swered the question of inclusion of other classes, for such an action
93. J.E.B. v. State, 606 So.2d 156 (Ala. Ct. Civ. App. 1992), cert. granted, J.E.B. v.
T.B., 113 S. Ct. 2330 (1993), wherein the Alabama court refused to extend Batson to a civil
action to establish paternity and to recover child support when peremptory challenges were
exercised on the basis of gender.
During oral argument held on November 3, 1993, the petitioner called upon the Supreme
Court to extend Batson not only to gender, but to all groups warranting Fourteenth Amend-
ment protection. Arguments Before the Court, 62 LAW WEEK (BNA) § 3, at 3329 (Nov. 9,
1993). The Court questioned the applicability of such a broad rule in practice, noting the
Ninth Circuit's adoption of the system. Id. at 3330. The respondent, in turn, contended that
Batson is unique to race, and that, if the struck jury method does have problems, perhaps
the only solution is to eliminate the challenge altogether. Id. at 3330-31.
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would result in a long, litigious road in which lawyers argue the
application of the Fourteenth Amendment principles to every class
within the purview of the Equal Protection Clause on a case-by-
case basis.
Patrick J. Guinee
